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Abstract
The influence of private actors, such as non-profit organizations (NPOs) and firms, has been increasing in disaster gov-
ernance. Previous literature has interrogated the responsibilities of states towards citizens in disasters, but the roles of
private actors have been insufficiently challenged. The article politicizes the entangled relations between NPOs, states,
and disaster-affected people. It proposes the Rawlsian division of moral labor as a useful, normative framework for inter-
rogating the justice of disaster governance arrangements in which ‘liberal’ states are involved. Liberal states have two
types of responsibilities in disasters: humanitarian and political. The humanitarian responsibilities imply provision of basic
resources needed for the capacity to make autonomous choices (domestically and abroad), while the political responsibili-
ties imply provision of the institutions needed for the liberal democratic citizenship (domestically). Through this analytical
lens and building on the wealth of existing scholarship, we illustrate the disaster governance role of the American Red
Cross in the United States (a 2005 hurricane) and in Haiti (the 2010 earthquake). Where, in Rawlsian terms, United States
is interpreted as a ‘liberal’ society, Haiti is framed as a ‘burdened’ society. The article proposes five points to consider
in analyzing disaster governance arrangements under neoliberal regimes, structured around the division of humanitarian
and political responsibilities. The article illustrates how NPOS are instrumental in blurring the boundaries between human-
itarian and political responsibilities. This might result ultimately in actual vulnerabilities remaining unaddressed.While the
Rawlsian approach challenges the privatization and lack of coordination in disaster governance, it is limited in analyzing
the political construction of ‘burdened’ societies.
Keywords
American Red Cross; disaster governance; disaster politics; division of moral labor
Issue
This article is part of the issue “The Politics of Disaster Governance” edited by Dorothea Hilhorst (Erasmus University
Rotterdam, The Netherlands), Kees Boersma (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, The Netherlands) and Emmanuel Raju
(University of Copenhagen, Denmark).
© 2020 by the authors; licensee Cogitatio (Lisbon, Portugal). This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribu-
tion 4.0 International License (CC BY).
1. Introduction
Many hazard types, from floods to nuclear tests, are
either created or influenced by humans, and their dev-
astating and unequal consequences to human lives are
mostly anthropogenic (Kelman, 2018). The question of
who is affected by a disaster, and in which manner,
is mediated by societal structures, built over extensive
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periods of time (Oliver-Smith, 2010). While it might be
impossible to imagine contemporary societies entire-
ly without disaster risk, this should not divert political
attention away from the severe inequalities of disaster
impacts. Vulnerability in face of disasters reflects peo-
ple’s marginalization in society (Gaillard, 2010; Watts &
Bohle, 1993). Politically marginalized places, communi-
ties and groups, such as informal settlements, distant
rural regions andminority groups tend to bemost severe-
ly affected by disasters—and neglected in their wake
(Cupples & Glynn, 2014; Pelling & Dill, 2010).
The inequalities of disaster governance are not only
manifested in who is affected, but also by who is not
affected. Unequal disaster risk is produced through pro-
cesses that enable certain groups of people to “min-
imize negative environmental externalities and appro-
priate positive environmental externalities in particular
places” (Collins, 2010, p. 258). The lack of capacity in
the face of disaster is often less a reflection of resources
but rather their inherently unequal distribution (Gaillard,
2010). Thus, disasters can expose the societal structures
and institutions, rather than merely disrupting them
(Guggenheim, 2014). Through accelerating or revealing
the adverse course of the status quo, theymight also pro-
vide a “critical juncture” to contest the political, econom-
ic, and cultural establishment (Pelling & Dill, 2010, p. 22).
In terms of such establishments, the nation-state con-
tinues to control vast part of the world’s resources and
impose territorial control. Simultaneously, the political
economic practices that follow neoliberalism have result-
ed in a rollback of states’ efforts to protect their cit-
izens, recasting the state as a protector of processes
of capital accumulation (Ferguson, 2010). Neoliberalism
is here seen as a “theory of political economic prac-
tices that proposes that human well-being can best be
advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial free-
doms and skills within an institutional framework char-
acterized by strong private property rights, free mar-
kets, and free trade” (Harvey, 2007, p. 2). While states
are recognized as key actors throughout the phases
of disaster governance—from mitigation and prepared-
ness, through response to recovery—the role of pri-
vate actors in disaster governance has been increasing
(Meriläinen, 2020).
Non-governmental organizations and non-profits are
private actors expected to gear their operations towards
the public good without a motive of profit (Lewis &
Kanji, 2009). In this article we refer to non-profit orga-
nizations (NPOs), but the discussion applies generally to
a variety of humanitarian and civil society organizations.
These actors are construed as ‘associations’ by Rawls
(2005), serving the essential purposes of human life but
being excluded from the realm of political responsibil-
ity. Our interest lies with organizations inhabiting the
space between the sphere of citizens and the sphere
of state, and between the individualized provision of
the market and the collectivized provision of the gov-
ernment (cf. Wagner, 2012). Within a neoliberal gover-
nance framework, such organizations are often assumed
to step in when states do not allocate resources, and
when commercial organizations are not able to oper-
ate profitably.
When NPOs take on an activity that typically asso-
ciates with state responsibilities—such as providing
health care or disaster shelters—they are not clearly and
primarily accountable to the citizens at large (Banerjee,
2014; O’Brien, Hayward, & Berkes, 2009). While there
have been calls for increased accountability of NPOs,
the accountability is likely to manifest towards donors
and other partners (Chowdhury, 2017) rather than the
disaster-affected people. The calls for increased account-
ability of NPOs have mainly amounted to further instru-
mentalization of assistance (Active Learning Network for
Accountability and Performance [ALNAP], 2015). While a
state’s mandate in disaster governance can be contest-
ed, an NPOs’ mandate is humanitarian, framed outside
the realm of everyday politics. Yet large humanitarian
actors have been criticized for ignoring local efforts by,
e.g., excluding national governments from the coordina-
tion of humanitarian assistance (Aly, 2016).
Our intention here is to bring the political more visi-
bly into focus in relation to NPOs involved in disaster gov-
ernance. In particular, we focus on the entangled rela-
tions and roles of NPOs, states, and the disaster-affected
people that the former two are purported to support.
In order to interrogate the political roles of NPOs entan-
gled with liberal states, we build on Rawlsian thinking
about the division ofmoral labor between the state, non-
profits, and for-profit firms (Cordelli, 2012; Mäkinen &
Kasanen, 2016; Mäkinen & Kourula, 2012) in the setting
of contemporary disaster governance. From a Rawlsian
perspective, liberal states have two types of responsibil-
ities in disasters: humanitarian responsibilities and polit-
ical responsibilities. Humanitarian responsibilities imply
provisioning humanitarian aid domestically and abroad,
while political responsibilities refer to securing capacities
required for liberal citizenship domestically (Voice, 2016),
while allowing ‘burdened’ societies tomake autonomous
political choices.
Through the analytical lens of division of moral labor
we explore the role of the American Red Cross (ARC)
in relation to a 2005 hurricane in the US and the 2010
earthquake in Haiti. Rather than providing original in-
depth case studies on the ARC and the two disasters,
we draw on pre-existing literature to illustrate a sce-
nario of the NPO’s role in disaster governance. We start
from a Rawlsian position that frames the US as a ‘liber-
al’ society (a constitutional democracy where laws and
statutes must be consistent with certain fundamental
rights and liberties) and Haiti as a non-liberal ‘burdened’
society (facing historical, social, and economic circum-
stances that inhibit reaching a situation where the citi-
zens recognize the basic structures as just; Rawls, 2001).
As a national Red Cross organization, the ARC is “indepen-
dent of government, and…based in the communities [it]
serve[s]” (International Federation of Red Cross and Red
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Crescent Societies, 2005), and its operations depend on
volunteers, donations, and tax-exempt status. Hence, the
ARC is here framed as an NPO, which in Rawlsian terms
would count as an association entangledwith the ‘liberal’
US society.
The article contributes to disaster studies by challeng-
ing the contemporary neoliberal disaster governance
through the normative Rawlsian framework with an
embedded emphasis on social justice, while also center-
ing NPOs as political actors potentially entangled with
the political agendas of a state. This is done through a
five-point list that shows how neoliberal disaster gover-
nance may change the organization of society and the
basic boundaries between the different spheres of soci-
ety in a politically significant manner. Furthermore, we
inform the Rawlsian perspective by sharpening its termi-
nology with respect to vulnerability and expanding the
framework’s scope to better account for NPOs’ increas-
ingly political role.
The following and second section of the arti-
cle presents an ideal Rawlsian approach to disas-
ter governance, emphasizing moral division of labor.
The section highlights both how the Rawlsian disaster
governance challenges contemporary neoliberal disaster
governance, but also discusses its limitations in doing so.
The third section illustrates the division of moral labor
in disaster governance following the US hurricane and
the Haiti earthquake through a focus on the ARC, and the
final section concludes the article.
2. Rawlsian Division of Moral Labor and Disaster
Governance
Neoliberalism as a regime of policies and practices
in Harvey’s (2007) sense involves the deployment
of market-based techniques of government, and the
construction of ‘responsibilized’ citizens that produce
governmental results without direct state interven-
tion (Ferguson, 2010). Neoliberal regimes have also
shaped the disaster governance policy and practice.
Manifestations include the roll-back of state responsibili-
ties frompeople’swellbeing in disasters (Jones&Vasvani,
2017), and associated expectations on disaster-affected
individuals and communities, to exhibit ‘resilience’
involving manifestations of agency and self-sufficiency
(Chandler, 2016; Grove, 2014). Meanwhile, examples of
the roll-out of the state are the increased securitiza-
tion/militarization of humanitarian relief abroadwith the
intent of securing neoliberal regimes in post-disaster set-
tings (Pyles, Svistova, & Ahn., 2017), and government
zoning and demolition of public housing projects in the
wake of disasters (Arena, 2011). Connected to these
developments, private actors, such as firms and NPOs,
have an increasing influence on how resources in disaster
governance are mobilized and used (Meriläinen, 2020;
O’Brien et al., 2009).
While social contracts have been evoked in literature
on climate change and disaster governance, particularly
to explore state-society relations, their analytical poten-
tial remains underexplored (Blackburn & Pelling, 2018).
Through applying the Rawlsian perspective, we respond
to the call to explore the multiplicity of social contracts
and interrogate the responsibility of private actors as
part of disaster governance arrangements (Blackburn &
Pelling, 2018). While other works have explored disaster
justice in place (e.g., Huang, 2018) and taken also norma-
tive philosophical stances to disasters (e.g., for the utili-
tarian stance, see Byskov, 2020), we contribute to the dis-
cussion on disasters and justice by placing the entangled
relations of NPOs, states, and disaster-affected people at
the center of inquiry.
In the following four sections we outline what dis-
aster governance studies can gain through applying a
Rawlsian perspective, particularly in terms of the moral
division of labor. First, we explore what a Rawlsian divi-
sion of moral labor would look like when applied to dis-
aster governance taking place in liberal societies. Second,
we explore the disaster governance responsibilities of lib-
eral states in disasters unfolding in burdened societies.
Thirdly, we develop a five-point list on the ways in which
the Rawlsian division of moral labor challenges the con-
temporary neoliberal disaster governance. Finally, we
conclude by bringing up critiques and problems with a
Rawlsian perspective to disaster governance.
2.1. Division of Moral Labor in the Context of Disaster
Governance in Liberal Societies
Rawls identifies three central properties of an ideal, lib-
eral state:
1) A democratic government that is ‘reasonably
just’ and serves peoples’ ‘fundamental interests’
(Rawls, 1999, p. 17).
2) Citizens having ‘common sympathies’ towards
each other (Rawls, 1999, p. 23).
3) Citizens having “a firm attachment to a political
(moral) conception of right and justice” (Rawls,
1999, p. 24).
The division ofmoral labor is key to achieving these three
properties. It refers to responsibilities over how various
political dimensions of society are divided between dif-
ferent institutions and actors (Rawls, 2005). The division
of moral labor outlines a just basic structure of society
(i.e., the system of major political institutions) to secure
just background conditions.Within these structures, indi-
viduals and associations have the space to advance their
ends effectively, without a constant need to take care
of the background justice (Rawls, 2005, p. 269). Without
the political control and design of the basic structure, the
power concentrates in capitalism over time and people
will lose their freedom (Rawls, 2005, pp. 267–269).
On the Rawlsian account, “a disaster occurswhen the
background institutions that support and maintain citi-
zens’ capacities for moral and political agency are signifi-
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cantly compromised” (Voice, 2016, p. 396). According to
the Rawlsian division of moral labor, the liberal state has
a humanitarian responsibility to provide its citizens the
essentials of human existence needed for moral agency,
such as nutrition, security, social relations, information,
and freedom. It also has the political responsibility to
secure the resources for liberal citizenship. Importantly,
humanitarian responsibility is understood to be a prereq-
uisite for political responsibility. Political responsibility
implies, for instance, upholding the institutions needed
for free and equal political participation, as well as real-
izing equal civil, political, and economic rights. Thus, a
major task of the Rawlsian disaster governance within
liberal societies is to reform and/or rebuild the institu-
tional structures needed for political citizenship (Rawls,
2001; Voice, 2016).
Following the Rawlsian division of moral labor, the
public responsibilities of justice cannot be privatized or
fully delegated to private actors. These associations are
meant to be voluntary organizations and they lack the
institutional capacity and political mandate to realize the
equal civil, political, and economic rights. As such, they
cannot perform the moral labor expected from the basic-
structure institutions. In this setting, the NPOs and firms
are supposed to operate on principles and aims related
to their civic and economic roles in a society. The basic-
structure institutions of the state, on the other hand, reg-
ulate and steer the activities of firms and associations to
ensure that they contribute to social justicemore broadly.
A central tenet is that government should be in control of
its public responsibilities of justice and not privatize the
associated tasks and powers to the firms and NPOs oper-
ating on a voluntary basis (Rawls, 2005, pp. 267–269).
A Rawlsian approach to disaster governance focus-
es on the division of responsibilities between the public
institutional structures and private actors such as NPOs
and for-profit firms. It emphasizes the major public tasks
of state institutions since the basic responsibilities of jus-
tice arise in social co-operation that takes place within
the common basic structures of society. In disaster gov-
ernance, NPOs as voluntary organizations can focus on
the humanitarian responsibility (moral agency), but also
produce liberal citizenship within the confines of state
institutions. According to Rawls (2001, pp. 5–8) citizens
in liberal democratic settings are collectively responsible
via democratic processes for the fairness of this struc-
ture regulating the division of burdens and advantages in
their own societies. However, in disasters, the fairness of
the basic structure of society is often jeopardized (or its
injustices are revealed) and citizens lose their abilities to
use their basic rights of citizenship thatwould allow them
to control the basic terms of their social co-operation.
2.2. Disaster Governance Responsibilities of Liberal
States in Burdened Societies
Rawls’ division of moral labor is particularly apt for dis-
cussing the ideals of disaster governance within liberal
societies. However, in the transnational context of con-
temporary disaster governance, the framework is also
helpful in interrogating the ideal disaster governance
responsibilities of liberal states with respect to disasters
unfolding in ‘burdened’ societies.
Rawls’ category of ‘burdened’ society refers to soci-
eties facing “historical, social, and economic circum-
stances that make achieving a well-ordered regime dif-
ficult if not impossible” (Rawls, 1999, p. 90). The ‘well-
ordered society’ depicts a situation where citizens recog-
nize the basic structures as just (Rawls 1999, p. 63). From
the Rawlsian perspective, burdened societies face a polit-
ical history that makes independent governance of the
society extremely challenging. Furthermore, according
to Rawls they might lack the “human capital and know-
how” and the “material and technical resources” needed
to manage their own affairs well (Rawls, 1999, p. 106).
According to a Rawlsian perspective, liberal states
have responsibilities of humanity towards all members
of humankind (Nagel, 2005). Thus, they have the human-
itarian responsibility to provide disaster-affected people
of burdened societies the essentials of normal human
functioning (Rawls, 1999). However, liberal states have
neither political responsibility nor mandate to steer the
development of burdened states towards liberal basic
structures. Rather, the political responsibility of the liber-
al state is to offer a burdened society a real choice toman-
age its own affairs well. This implies offering resources to
the actors in a burdened society needed for the indepen-
dent governance of society. Taking the division of moral
labor seriously, the liberal state would need to consid-
er the root causes that undermine political responsibility
(political, cultural, colonial history, lack of resources) in a
burdened society. It is particularly important to consider
how the liberal state itself might be responsible for these
structural vulnerabilities.
Rawlsmaintains that also in the setting of a burdened
society, the liberal state can assign associations (such as
NPOs) humanitarian responsibilities, and these organiza-
tions can offer assistance on the basis of duties of char-
ity (see Valentini, 2013). However, these actors should
stay within the bounds of humanitarian responsibilities
and remain out of political institution-building. A respon-
sible liberal state would not try to liberalize burdened
societies in disaster settings via private actors. The pri-
mary political responsibilities for the institutional issues
of political citizenship belong to the domestic political
authorities in the burdened societies facing a disaster.
For Rawls, the basic political responsibility of a liberal
society is to offer resources for burdened societies to
make autonomous political choices in these settings.
2.3. A Division of Moral Labor in Neoliberal Disaster
Governance
In the Rawlsian account, a disaster is foremost a human-
itarian crisis jeopardizing peoples’ moral agency, i.e.,
capacity to make autonomous choices, and secondly a
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political crisis that challenges peoples’ abilities to func-
tion as responsible liberal democratic citizens. Unlike a
neoliberal proposition for disaster governance, with its
focus on resilient individuals and communities (Chandler,
2016), the Rawlsian approach focuses on the institution-
al backgrounds that might enable agency and resilient
self-organization. For Rawls, in the case of disasters,
states should primarily be responsible for supporting
their citizens’ resources to function as moral persons
and free and equal citizens. Thus, Rawlsian states are
not primarily frames for global economic activities, and
disasters are not just an economic crisis or opportuni-
ty. For Voice (2016), as a matter of political definition,
disasters challenge the basic structures of societies and
the institutional backgrounds ofmoral agency and liberal
democratic citizenship.
We see a perspective building on a Rawlsian division
of moral labor as relevant for analyzing and challeng-
ing how contemporary neoliberal approaches to disas-
ter governance alter the division between the political
and humanitarian responsibility. Based on our reading
of Rawls (see also Mäkinen & Kasanen, 2016; Mäkinen
& Kourula, 2012), we suggest five relevant points to con-
sider when analyzing disaster governance in a neoliber-
al setting:
1) Political responsibility can be lost when basic polit-
ical responsibilities of the state are privatized and
delegated to NPOs and firms.
2) The humanitarian responsibility can be lost as a
disaster offers an opportunity to nationalize and
extend the political control of the state into the tra-
ditional areas of private life.
3) The location of the basic institutional boundaries
between the public and private spheres of soci-
ety may be blurred, sharpened, or changed, which
may change the division of political and humanitar-
ian responsibility.
4) Empty spaces of responsibility between the polit-
ical and humanitarian responsibility may be pro-
duced or filled in a way that some people (i.e., the
politically marginalized members of society) are
increasingly excluded or included in a society.
5) There may be a situation of overlapping of human-
itarian and political responsibility where the dif-
ferent institutions, organizations, and individual
actors operate without coordination or separation
of their roles and tasks.
Thus, the division ofmoral labor helpsmaking visiblemul-
tiple possible political implications of neoliberal disaster
governance.
2.4. Limitations of the Division of Moral Labor in
Challenging Neoliberal Disaster Governance
We recognize Rawls’ theory as an ‘ideal theory of jus-
tice,’ and with that a need for some adaptation for
its use particularly in burdened societies. Firstly, a
Rawlsian approach to disaster governance alone pro-
vides insufficient attention to historically-built structural
vulnerabilities across various scales. A lack of capaci-
ties in the face of disaster is often less a reflection
of resources but rather their inherently unequal distri-
bution (Gaillard, 2010). This also links to the debate
between a Rawlsian social primary goods approach and
Sen’s and Nussbaum’s capabilities approach to the ques-
tion ofmetrics of justice (c.f. Robeyns&Brighouse, 2010).
While not positing to solve this debate, as an adapta-
tion we suggest a shift of focus from the availability of
resources to capacities to cope with damage from disas-
ters (Gibb, 2018).
Secondly, building on these observations about vul-
nerability, one issue with Rawls’ focus on categories for
societies (from ‘liberal’ to ‘burdened’) is that they apply
statically on state-level. This takes the analytical atten-
tion away from the processes of marginalization, within
and across borders, that result in an uneven allocation
of disaster risk (c.f. Collins, 2010). For instance, while a
society might be labelled ‘liberal,’ it is highly likely that
the marginalized members of that society do not see the
government as ‘reasonably just’ and serving their ‘fun-
damental interests’ (Rawls, 1999, pp. 23–24, 90, 106).
Meanwhile, the label ‘burdened’might be stuck on a soci-
ety that did not become burdened on its own but was
made into one as part of another nation or empire alto-
gether. Climate change will also further challenge the
notion of a social contract connected to a single state
(O’Brien et al., 2009). It is also useful to keep in mind
theMarxian critique of Rawls (c.f. Harvey, 1973) asserting
that Rawls’ liberal theory of justice does not sufficiently
account for questions of the role of capitalism and pri-
vate property in the creation of injustice (Drozdz, 2014).
Thirdly, the Rawlsian approach also holds a focus on
citizens, rather than people more broadly. The disaster-
affected people are likely to be marginalized in and
across societies. The marginalized also tend to lack citi-
zenship at various scales: whether that means stateless-
ness (e.g., Rohingya; see Ahmed et al., 2018) or informali-
ty (e.g.,Meriläinen, Fougère, & Piotrowicz, 2020). Siddiqi
and Canuday (2018) illustrate that, when scrutinizing
social contracts in case of disasters, one should not start
with the static notion of a state, but rather foreground
people’s experience of citizenship. That might mean
observing, as the authors do, how the state-citizenship
contract and its inequalities weather a disaster relatively
unscathed (Siddiqi & Canuday, 2018).
In summary and keeping the above critiques in
mind, the Rawlsian liberal state represents the collective
responsibility of its citizens. In the case of a disaster in a
liberal society, the state has a humanitarian responsibili-
ty to provide the citizens the essential capacities needed
for human existence. It also has the political responsibil-
ity to secure the capacities of liberal citizenship, which
involves reforming and/or rebuilding the domestic insti-
tutional structure needed for free and equal citizenship.
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Humanitarian responsibility is the prerequisite for politi-
cal responsibility. Of the two responsibilities, humanitari-
an responsibility is the one that can bedelegated toNPOs
and firms, when the activities of these associations are
regulated by the institutions of the state. While liberal
states have a humanitarian responsibility towards bur-
dened states facing a disaster, they have neither the polit-
ical responsibility nor mandate to provide institutions
needed for the equal civil, political, and economic rights.
Liberal democracies need to respect the political auton-
omy of the societies that lack the will or capacity to cre-
ate and maintain liberal democratic political institutions.
Disasters are not to be seen as a political opportunity to
liberalize burdened societies (Rawls, 1999).
3. Exploring the Political and Humanitarian
Responsibility of the American Red Cross
In many ways, the Red Cross epitomizes the humanitar-
ianism and disaster aid discourse. The movement con-
sists of the International Committee of the Red Cross
coordinating humanitarian aid in wars, the International
Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies coor-
dinating disaster aid, and 190 national organizations
collecting donations, initiating aid, and training staff
(Johansson, 2017). The ARC is one of the national orga-
nizations existing between the ‘voluntary’ realm and the
state (Irwin, 2013). While being privately funded and
staffed, the organization has close ties with US govern-
ment (Irwin, 2013). The ARC is a disaster-relief part-
ner of the Federal Emergency Response Agency (FEMA)
and it has a close governmental association (Groscurth,
2011), including the president of US acting as its hon-
orary chairman who holds the power to appoint politi-
cal nominees to various functions in ARC’s governance
(ARC, n.d.). This while ARC at the same time frames its
activities through principles of impartiality, neutrality,
and independence.
ARC and its involvement in disaster governance pro-
vide a relevant illustration of an NPO that, in a Rawlsian
sense, reshapes basic institutional boundaries between
the public and private and changes the division of moral
labor in the societies it operates in. The Rawlsian analy-
tical frame brings out how the public responsibilities of
justice in the setting of liberal society can be altered.
The ARC can undermine the political responsibilities of
the state and create tensions between the political and
humanitarian responsibilities. A Rawlsian framing shows
how the liberal state can turn its duty to assist a bur-
dened society in managing its own affairs well into the
policy where a burdened society is made increasingly
dependent on the assistance activities of hybrid organi-
zations like the ARC. These actors blur the boundaries
between the political and humanitarian responsibility as
the humanitarian responsibility is increasingly politicized
and the political responsibility is increasingly privatized.
In this section wewill examine closer ARC’s role in chang-
ing the divisions of moral labor through two illustrations
of disaster governance following a hurricane in the US
(2005) and the earthquake in Haiti (2010).
3.1. Hurricane 2005, New Orleans, US
In 2005 a hurricane (Katrina) produced a storm surge
that cracked the poorly maintained levees protecting the
bowl-like city of New Orleans that lays below the sea
level (Yarnal, 2007). Altogether, 2000 people lost their
lives and millions were left homeless in the aftermath
(ARC, 2016). The impacts were unequally distributed,
with marginalized black populations suffering the harsh-
est impacts across the phases of disaster governance
(Yarnal, 2007). In preparedness, the public support was
inadequate in scope and themarginalized lacked the per-
sonal resources to evacuate—resulting in them facing
the disaster directly, together with the response from
the emergency services (Yarnal, 2007).
The recovery further exacerbated the pre-existing
inequalities. The black populations living in poverty were
not only likely to have suffered the direct impacts of
the hurricane, they were also less likely to have afford-
ed insurances, or possessed the economic and social
capital needed to negotiate bureaucracies and more
easily recover their lives (Masozera, Bailey, & Kerchner,
2007). While they did exhibit agency, relying on com-
munity and God, they were interpreted by observers
as lacking independence and control over their fates, a
model of agency exhibited and afforded by, particularly,
the white middle-classes (Stephens, Hamedani, Markus,
Bergsieker, & Eloul, 2009). While the disaster continues
to be (re)mediated in the shiftingmedia landscape, in the
aftermath the racialized disaster-affected people were
framed “blameworthy, irresponsible and failed citizens
who pathologically insisted on staying put despite public
warnings to evacuate” (Cupples & Glynn, 2014, p. 368).
Additionally, the communal and cultural life of the Tremé
neighborhood, once “one of the most prosperous and
politically active black communities” in the US, was heav-
ily hit by the disaster and its governance (Allen & Maret,
2011, p. 116). In Rawlsian terms, the disaster gover-
nance efforts produced empty spaces of responsibility.
The marginalized members of the society facing the dis-
aster were depicted as exhibiting the wrong kind of cit-
izenship and agency, which in turn supposedly justified
the absence of political responsibility.
The US governmental response was heavily criticized.
While issues were raised regarding the federal, state, and
local governments’ roles separately, it was particularly
FEMA that might have been able to make a difference
once the hurricane was unfolding (see Roberts, 2006).
The organization had previously had an all-hazards, all-
phases mandate, but since 2001 the organization had
been disintegrating, and its area of responsibility had
been decentralized (Roberts, 2006). The 2005 hurricane
overwhelmed the local public administration and it took
several days for the federal response to kick in (Schneider,
2005). Meanwhile, the US also struggled to receive aid
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offered by other states (Kelman, 2007). In the reconstruc-
tion phase, the large governmental programs for housing
were seen to be failing at bringing the locals back home,
due to lack of trust in citizens and inappropriately cumber-
some procedures (Allen &Maret, 2011). In recovery plan-
ning, commercial interests were placed ahead of the well-
being of the city’s (pre-hurricane) residents: For instance,
public housing projects such as Lafitte were to be demol-
ished and privatized (Barrios, 2011). People were turn-
ing to various actors for support, including NPOs, reli-
gious groups, and even small governmental actors (Allen
& Maret, 2011). It is clear that following the 2005 hur-
ricane, disaster governance was privatized through del-
egating it to firms and NPOs. In this process, overlaps
between different scales of government and among vari-
ous private and non-state actors were being created.
A focus on the ARC helps to further explore the
ways in which NPOs were altering the moral division of
labor in disaster governance. In 2010, the ARC seemed
to be closing the case of the 2005 hurricanes (Rita and
Wilma in addition to Katrina). The organization stated
having provided both emergency response (e.g., 1,400
emergency shelters and 68 million hot meals), and a
recovery program (“planning and advocacy services”
for 13,200 families, and “mental health or substance
abuse treatment” for 22,500 people; ARC, 2010a, p. 2).
The ARC highlights that it is not a government agency
and hence depends on donations and volunteer labor
(ARC, 2010b). Furthermore, the organization argues that
“some disasters are so big that no agency—government
or nonprofit—can do it all” (ARC, 2010b), framing govern-
ment as one agency among many.
The success of ARC, apparently, lies in partner-
ships: particularly in those forged between the nonprof-
it and corporate actors. The ARC CEO Gail McGovern
and a Business Roundtable’s representative co-authored
in 2010 an article entitled “Corporate and Nonprofit
Collaboration Is the Best Recipe for Disaster Response,”
highlighting how cross-sector and public-private partner-
ships should be in place already in the disaster prepared-
ness phase (McGovern & Dan, 2010). The corporate sec-
tor is hailed as the source of resources and (volunteer)
labor, with the article making a link between an asso-
ciation of 180+ CEOs and on-the-ground disaster relief
expertise (McGovern&Dan, 2010).While the ARC argues
they have since 2005 “improved coordination with local
and state governments, as well as with the federal gov-
ernments and FEMA” (ARC, 2010a, p. 5), the role of the
public sector seems like an afterthought amidst the calls
for partnerships. However, against the background of
ARC’s ties with the US state, the organization’s communi-
cation and activities can be seen to blur the boundaries
between political and humanitarian responsibilities.
3.2. Earthquake 2010, Port-au-Prince, Haiti
Framing Haiti as a ‘burdened’ society necessitates
contextualizing it within a transnational (post)colonial
regime that has systematically undermined the Haitian
government’s ability to provide humanitarian and polit-
ical responsibilities to the majority of its population
(Concannon & Lindstrom, 2011). Haiti became inde-
pendent in 1804, as people enslaved by the French
rebelled (Oliver-Smith, 2010). The 20th century saw var-
ious national and transnational elites consolidate power
through exclusion, exploitation, and violence (Hallward,
2010). Haiti is considered one of the first nations to be
controlled through financial colonialism, forced to com-
ply with the governing strategies of foreign (liberal) cred-
itor nations. The (post)colonial history and its material
inheritance is ever-present in Haiti, and for decades pri-
or to the earthquake the state was already known as
“the NPO republic” (Fatton, 2011). Tens of thousands
of NPOs partnering with transnational financial institu-
tions had been channeling development and humani-
tarian aid to the society rattled by “structural adjust-
ment programs” (Fatton, 2011). This background served
to naturalize how seamlessly the moral division of labor
was reorganized during the post-disaster response of the
2010 earthquake.
When a shallow magnitude 7.0 Mw earthquake
shook Haiti in 2010, the human losses and sufferingwere
immense in a society of 10 million people. According
to the varying estimates, the death count following
the earthquake ranges between 46,000 and 300,000
(Associated Press, 2011), while 1,5 million people were
injured and 895,000–1,5 million people were forced to
move into temporary camps, where hundreds of thou-
sands of people continued to live years after the earth-
quake. Beyond the direct human suffering, the mate-
rial and economic losses (at 7,8 billion USD) are esti-
mated to have exceeded Haiti’s GDP in the year 2009
(Ramachandran & Walz, 2015).
The earthquake damaged the state’s capacities to car-
ry out political responsibilities as almost all government
buildings were destroyed, and as a result Haiti’s gov-
ernment was ham-strung in its post-disaster response.
The transnational communitywas fairly quick to respond,
with the US government disbursing almost 2 billion USD
and pledging over 3 billion USD for relief and recon-
struction (Ramachandran & Walz, 2015). But this was
hardly an example of an ideal response from a liberal
state in terms of acting upon its humanitarian respon-
sibility towards a burdened society. In an unprecedent-
ed move, the Haitian parliament was asked to dissolve
itself to make way for the Interim Haiti Reconstruction
Commission, which was co-chaired by former US pres-
ident Bill Clinton and Jean Bellerive, Prime Minister of
Haiti (Schuller, 2017). This arrangement was legitimized
by calls from transnational donors to guarantee the
“oversight and accountability in the rebuilding process”
(Delva, 2010). As Fatton (2011) points out, the idea of
transforming Haiti into a de facto trusteeship is not
new, but the earthquake in combination with the rise
of humanitarian interventionism enabled its quick and
largely uncontested realization.
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Analyzing the response to the Haiti earthquake
through a Rawlsian framing of moral division of labor
shows that the 2010 earthquake, if not completely
altered, then at least blurred the division of politi-
cal and humanitarian responsibility. Transnational assis-
tance sidestepped the state structures of Haiti, with
less than 1% of transnational aid going through the
government of Haiti, and instead going through multi-
lateral agencies and transnational NPOs (Minn, 2017),
such as the ARC. The US government did not disburse
any of its humanitarian aid to the Haitian government
(Ramachandran & Walz, 2015). In the US ARC was still
recovering from heavy critique following the handling
of Katrina. The ARC saw the Haiti’s earthquake a “a
spectacular fundraising opportunity” (Elliot & Sullivan,
2015), with the organization able to erase a 100 mil-
lion USD deficit through continuing to fundraise far
beyond the calculated need (Elliot & Sullivan, 2015). This
over-fundraising also contributed to further losing polit-
ical responsibility as the ARC outsourced a number of
projects to other transnational NPOs (Elliot & Sullivan,
2015). Concannon and Lindstrom (2011, p. 1147) point
to how Haiti was treated by liberal states as “a charity
case” rather than as a space where humanitarian respon-
sibilities exist and guide interventions.
Humanitarian responsibility was further lost as the
local Haitian NPOs were almost completely sidestepped
in the distribution of post-disaster relief funds by transna-
tional donors. Such a division had been solidified through
decades of strategic use of development and humanitar-
ian aid for the political aims of other nations, not least
the US, which had used aid to Haiti to leverage com-
pliance with US foreign policy (Elliot & Sullivan, 2015).
At the same time, as Minn (2017, p. 210) points out, it
is questionable if the Haitian state has ever adequate-
ly addressed the needs of its population through basic
structures and institutional capacities. According toMinn
(2017, p. 210 drawing on Trouillot, 1990):
The racial, social and geographic hierarchies have led
to the majority of the Haitian population existing on
the margins of the state apparatus, while the urban
elite who have had access to government have pri-
marily used it as a means for personal financial gain.
The Haitian state today has inherited a legacy of weak
institutions, high rates of professional emigration and
limited avenues for generating revenue.
In this context, the ARC and other foreign NPOs on the
one hand clearly contribute to further privatizing polit-
ical responsibility by creating a parallel system of basic
structures, but on the other hand they also fill a void
of a lack of public services. The earthquake itself great-
ly harmed the already weak state-administrative capac-
ities and institutions, but this was further exacerbated
by the strategic transnational donations that promoted
humanitarian responsibilities on the expense of politi-
cal responsibilities and thus ended up further weaken-
ing Haiti’s basic institutions (Zanotti, 2010). At the same
time, the complex and intimate relations between the
ARC and the US government ensured that disaster gov-
ernance in Haiti was not simply a matter of a neoliber-
al roll-back of the state, either in terms of political or
humanitarian responsibility. Humanitarian responsibility
was unclear as on the streets of Port-au Prince US mili-
tary was a visible element, as US troops flew in aid and
evacuated foreigners while remaining autonomous and
not under UN command (Pyles et al., 2017).
Minn (2017, p. 211) shows how the humanitarian dis-
course, as embodied by the ARC, produces and repro-
duces “an idealized dyad of generous donor and needy
recipient,” which is not contextualized in the state struc-
tures of most of the Global South. Aid workers did not
consider the government of Haiti to be a “worthy recip-
ient of aid” in and of itself, and its reliability as an inter-
mediary for aid was also constantly questioned.
Following our Rawlsian framing, the post-disaster
response to Haiti with its extreme skewing of aid through
transnational NPOs served to create a situation of not
only overlapping, but conflictual relations between polit-
ical and humanitarian responsibilities. This was visi-
ble in how foreign donors’ concerns often did not
align with identified government priorities, e.g., trans-
portation sector pledges exceeded government requests
by 510%, while the Haitian government’s request for
strengthening democratic institutions fell short by 80%
(Ramachandran&Walz, 2015, p. 8). The extreme concen-
tration of aid flows to transnational NPOs also arguably
meant that the NPOs asserted more influence over local
politics than the local population (Loewenstein, 2015;
Zanotti, 2010). From the perspective of the local pop-
ulations in Haiti, the regimes of disaster governance
served to further blur the spaces of responsibility and
the situation of overlapping political and humanitarian
responsibilities, where “[h]umanitarian, development,
and peacekeeping agendas become intertwined and, at
least from a ground-up point-of-view, largely indistin-
guishable” (Wagner, 2014, p. 244).
4. Concluding Discussion
In this article we have discussed the role of private
actors, NPOs in particular, as part of disaster governance.
We framed our analysis through a Rawlsian framework
on the division of moral labor, which implies that liberal
states have two types of responsibilities in disaster gov-
ernance: political and humanitarian. Political responsibil-
ity constitutes the provision of institutions needed for
the liberal citizenship, while humanitarian responsibility
involves supporting the provision of nutrition, security,
social relations, information, and freedom that are need-
ed for the moral agency (Voice, 2016).
According to the Rawlsian perspective, liberal states’
primary responsibilities in disaster governance consist of
supporting the citizens of liberal democracies facing a dis-
aster through: (1) humanitarian aid, and (2) liberal demo-
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cratic institution building. Liberal states also have human-
itarian responsibilities towards citizens of burdened soci-
eties, but they lack political responsibilities andmandate.
That is, liberal states have a duty to provide humanitari-
an necessities and resources, but they should not inter-
fere in the internal politics nor strive to create liberal
democratic institutions. Rather, liberal states should sup-
port political institution building by the burdened soci-
eties without the political and economic strings attached.
The aim of the liberal democratic assistance should be to
support burdened societies governing their own political
and socio-economic affairs and at the same time respect
the political self-determination of citizens of burdened
societies. While humanitarian responsibilities can be del-
egated to specialized private organizations such as NPOs
or firms, political responsibilities should remain real and
in the hands of states.
In the illustrations of the article, the ARC is seen as
an NPO that a liberal democratic state (US) has dele-
gated disaster governance responsibilities to. From the
Rawlsian perspective, those responsibilities should be
humanitarian, not political. However, scrutinizing the
arrangements between the ARC and the state (US) in
relation to the two disasters discussed reveals how the
realities of those arrangements fall short of the Rawlsian
ideal. The organization is not operating simply on a vol-
untary basis within the basic structure of the society,
but the organization is very much entangled with the US
state (Groscurth, 2011; Irwin, 2013).
Following the hurricane of 2005, but also prior to
it, the ‘liberal’ US should have carried: (1) the political
responsibility of securing political institutions that liber-
al citizenship rests upon, as well as the (2) humanitarian
responsibility for the moral agency of its citizens. The lack
of safe infrastructure, appropriate public evacuation mea-
sures, and reconstruction prioritizing commercial inter-
ests, all point out to how across the phases of disaster gov-
ernance the capacities of the marginalized populations
were hampered by theways inwhich the division ofmoral
labor was organized. In terms of our five-point Rawlsian
list, it seems that before, during, and after the hurricane
of 2005 in the US, the political responsibility was priva-
tized towards non-profits and businesses. This implies a
situation where the marginalized US citizens affected by
the hurricane were losing their political citizenship and
becoming increasingly dependent on the humanitarian
support of the NPOs, religious groups, and the like. In the
disaster governance arrangements, the ARC represents
the blurring of boundaries between the sphere of citi-
zens and the sphere of state since the hybrid organization
is operating on both sides of the boundary. Such disas-
ter governance arrangements relying heavily on private
actorsmay lead to the situation of overlapping humanitar-
ian and political responsibility where the different states,
private actors, and disaster-affected people operate with-
out the coordination or separation of their roles and tasks.
Meanwhile, in the case of the 2010 Haiti earth-
quake, the US should have given their support to the
‘burdened’ Haitian state, while assisting in humanitari-
an ways and staying out of the politics of liberal insti-
tution building. This obviously did not happen, as Haiti
on US’s behest was turned into a virtual trusteeship.
These actions should be contextualized in the active post-
independence involvement by the US in Haitian poli-
tics which contributed to the inability of Haitian govern-
ment to assume its political responsibilities. In the dis-
aster governance arrangements that unfolded after the
2010 earthquake, the ARC contributed to the mixing and
blurring of the boundaries between political and human-
itarian responsibilities. From the Rawlsian perspective
this type of system of overlapping responsibilities leads
easily to major problems. In this setting, the political
responsibilities are delegated to NPOs and firms lack-
ing the political mandate and institutional resources to
take care of these responsibilities. Furthermore, these
political roles and tasks distract the NPOs from their
primary humanitarian responsibilities. Disaster gover-
nance arrangements where humanitarian responsibili-
ty is politicized and political responsibility privatized
have various adverse effects, as they: (1) leave marginal-
ized people vulnerable, (2) transform NPOs into political
agents of liberal governments and undermine the trust in
their political neutrality, and (3) make the political struc-
tures of the host countries of the disasters more bur-
dened in the process.
In the case of the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, the
Marxist critique of Rawls (c.f. Harvey, 1973) is relevant.
The critique argues that the Rawls’ liberal theory of jus-
tice takes insufficiently into account questions regarding
the role of capitalism and private property in the cre-
ation of injustice (Drozdz, 2014). For example, the debts
levied by liberal states after Haiti’s independence have
continued to severely impoverish the society, keeping
Haiti dependent on its creditors, including the US and
transnational financial institutions (Oliver-Smith, 2010;
Schuller, 2017). While taking the division of moral labor
seriously would imply that liberal states would consid-
er their part in constructing the structural vulnerabili-
ties facing ‘burdened’ societies, the Rawlsian approach
shows limited attention to such historical and political
perspectives. Furthermore, the focus on state and relat-
ed citizenship embedded in Rawls’ thinking will become
increasingly problematic amidst climate change (O’Brien
et al., 2009) and in cases where those most marginal-
ized are framed outside national citizenship (c.f. Ahmed
et al., 2018). Furthermore, the primacy of states in disas-
ter governance is challenged by multi-actor governance
arrangements unfolding on various scales. However, as
states still exert significant control over the people and
resources in their territories, it makes sense to interro-
gate the contemporary political, economic, and cultural
establishment with states serving as the starting point
(Pelling & Dill, 2010).
This article has contributed to the disaster studies lit-
erature by politicizing NPOs’ involvement in disaster gov-
ernance arrangements (see Blackburn & Pelling, 2018)
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and by challenging the contemporary neoliberal disaster
governance through a Rawlsian framework, contributing
thus to normative political philosophical approaches to
disasters (c.f. Byskov, 2020). However, we believe there
is room for further research that is more attuned, for
instance, to how the humanitarian and political responsi-
bilities shift across the phases of disasters. Furthermore,
while the division of moral labor framework is apt for
challenging disaster governance arrangements in which
‘liberal’ states are involved, further decolonial disaster
research (c.f. Siddiqi & Canuday, 2018) interrogating the
(lack of) justice or rights in transnational disaster gover-
nance arrangements would be highly important.
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